Legal History Research Seminar AK GRR on Migration, Friday 8th December 2017
Tobias Becker (GHIL London) on our co-organized workshop (together with Daniel Steinbach, Exter) “Competitors and Companions: Britons and Germans in the World”
GRR Legal History Research group: Our next meeting will discuss “Scandalous Trials” on Friday, 14th June 2017, with short presentations by Susanne Raidt (Marburg), Norman Domeier (Stuttgart/Wien) and Caspar Hirschi (St. Gallen).
In the all-time ranking of historic speeches, London wartime speeches feature prominently, and Charles de Gaulle’s first calls for resistance are certainly high up on the list. His address to the French nation right after his arrival in Great Britain, and his strong appeal to continue resistance, are known well beyond France. The myth is still strong: This is where de Gaulle declared his leadership of the Free French in London, where he captured the fighting spirit of the resistance against Nazi Germany and Vichy France, laying a fundament for eventual allied victory. The sentiment of the speech, the date of the 18 of June and the name of de Gaulle are so closely linked, that the French leader has subsequently been dubbed “l’homme du 18 juin” (the man of 18 June):
However, the first thing to note about the Appeal of 18 June is that when talking about it we usually refer to the Appeal of 22 June. While de Gaulle did first address the French people right after his arrival in London on June 18th, no recording of the broadcast exists, only manuscripts, notes, and posters printed with its text. Because of its spontaneity, it is also highly likely that the first broadcast only reached a very small audience. The speech we now usually associate with the Appeal of 18 June was actually recorded on 22 June and archived by the B.B.C. as “General Charles de Gaulle: Call to Resistance, 22.6.1940”.
Today, 77 years after its original broadcasting, it is time to have a closer look: What exactly did he say and what did it mean?
In the following paragraphs, I will analyse parts of his speech. I will be quoting the translation available on the BBC website, but for a better impression, I highly recommend listening to de Gaulles speech in the original French available in the INA online collections.
As is well known, de Gaulle openly distanced himself in his speech from Pétain’s acceptance of armistice, calling it “capitulation” and “surrender” and challenges the government’s right to accept it. Doing so, he employs a strategy of different arguments, which he sums up as “honour, common sense, and the interests of the country”:
- the moral argument: honour and duty
- the rational argument: military and financial strength
- the strategic argument: future planning and France’s role in Europe
- 1) Honour and Duty:
“It may therefore be said that this armistice would not only be a capitulation, but that it would also reduce the country to slavery.[…] As long as the allies continue the war, her government has no right to surrender to the enemy.” De Gaulle refers to the other governments-in-exile present in London continuing to represent their country, as an example: “The Polish, Norwegian, Belgian, Netherlands, and Luxemburg governments, though driven from their territories, have thus interpreted their duty.”
While, of course, he had every right to criticise the armistice as an individual refugee, he clearly did not intent to speak as a civilian, but with a political agenda and the idea to address the French people as leader figure. With his discourse, he places himself and the Free France he aims to represent amongst a broader community: The community of European governments-in-exile who had fled to London during May 1940 and now represented the joint Allied war effort – at this point, Soviet Russia still fought alongside Nazi Germany, and the USA were more than reluctant to get involved in yet another messy European war. De Gaulle defines it as a French duty not to collaborate with Germany, but to continue fighting with the Allies. His position, however, is very different from those of the other European powers, and I will discuss his “bluff” below in more detail.
- 2) Military and financial strength
“But we still have a vast empire, our fleet is intact, and we possess large sums in gold. We still have allies, who possess immense resources and who dominate the seas. We still have the gigantic potentialities of American industry. The same war conditions which caused us to be beaten by 5,000 planes and 6,000 tanks can tomorrow bring victory by means of 20,000 tanks and 20,000 planes.” With these words, de Gaulle seems to be addressing the Allied Forces just as much as his compatriots at home: The goal is to convey that France is not lost, that it is strong and battle-ready. The French should be reminded that they are neither helpless nor alone, the Allies should be reminded that France is not a welfare case, but continues to be a strong ally. The motivation behind this is obvious: French soldiers are more likely to join and risk their lives, the allies more likely to provide political recognition and military support, if both believe that this is not a lost cause but a promising venture. Again, de Gaulle is mainly bluffing. The military equipment he is referring to belongs to Vichy France, still the only France recognised by International Law. While later on, de Gaulle manages to mobilise soldiers amongst the French in Great Britain, and gain influence over French troops, in particular in Northern Africa, he had no control over any kind of military or financial resources at the time of his appeal. Additionally, contrary to his allusions, the US had not yet started supporting the allied struggle.
- 3) Future planning and France’s role in Europe
De Gaulle stresses the framework beyond the Franco-German conflict:” This is a world war. No one can foresee whether the neutral countries of today will not be at war tomorrow, or whether Germany’s allies will always remain her allies. If the powers of freedom ultimately triumph over those of servitude, what will be the fate of a France which has submitted to the enemy?”. Again, this part of the speech addresses the French as well as the Allies: Yes, de Gaulle and his project of Free France might seem utopian and almost ludicrous with regard to the current situation, but who knows what the future will hold? De Gaulle plays it as a central argument that alliances can change overnight (and history proved him more than right on this) and that you need to seize all opportunuties you can get to fight this battle. To the French, he paints a picture of eventual ramifications of collaboration: Firmly believing (or at least bluffing to believe) in allied victory, he makes allusions to consequences of discontinued resistance with regard to France’s standing in Europe and the world.
De Gaulle’s Call to Arms
The intent of this broadcast is twofold: In his words, de Gaulle wants to mobilize French soldiers (and others) to continue the fight at the side of the allies and to join him in London, bringing along as much military equipment as they can lay hands on. At the same time, his appeal is a claim to power in London and in the allied hierarchy. His appeal is highly personalised: “I, General de Gaulle, am undertaking this national task here in England. I call upon all French servicemen of the land, sea, and air forces; I call upon French engineers and skilled armaments workers who are on British soil, or have the means of getting here, to come and join me. I call upon the leaders, together with all soldiers, sailors, and airmen of the French land, sea, and air forces, wherever they may now be, to get in touch with me. I call upon all Frenchmen who want to remain free to listen to my voice and follow me.” As we know now, he should eventually be quite successful with this attempt. De Gaulle managed to gather between 2.000-3.000 men in London by August 1940. More men should follow his command in the Northern African theatres of war. Even though, de Gaulle always remained a highly disputed figure, even amongst the French in London. Looking back, the success of his appeal is striking: When calling on Frenchmen to follow him, he was in no position whatsoever to demand this. He himself had just been whisked off by a British plane, arriving the in London only the previous day. No government, national committee or anything along these lines had yet been set up. Considering France committed to armistice, and thus continued existing as a theoretically free country in the form of Vichy France, there could not be a government-in-exile as in the case of the other defeated and occupied European countries. In this light, de Gaulle’s appeal to leave France to follow him to London and join the allied fight was a call to join a one-man-show. Even worse, technically and legally, lacking any kind of status for extra-Vichy forces, this amounted to desertion. Eventually, de Gaulles managed to gather French politicians and military leaders like René Cassin and Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu in London and by the Churchill-de Gaulle accords of 7 August 1940, he was recognised by the British as the leader of France Libre (Free France), and the latter recognised as a military and political partner of the Allies.
While the cooperation between France and his fellow Allies (and certainly on a personal level between de Gaulle and his fellow leaders) did not remain conflict-free during the war, de Gaulle’s bluff with the appeal of 18/22 june certainly payed off. His speech continued to be a symbol for his success, even though it was in no way predictable. In 2005, the appeal of 18 June was added to the UNESCO Memory of the World Register after being nominated in a joint effort by France and Britain via INA and BBC, arguing that it is proof that “ Radio was no longer just a means of entertainment or propaganda available to the powers that be; it also now provided the technical means to enable an isolated individual to launch a huge resistance movement from outside his own country, to urge his fellow citizens to oppose foreign rule and subservience and to fight for the restoration of freedoms.” The “isolated individual” had played his cards right. As de Gaulle said to conclude his broadcast: “Long live free France in honour and independence!”
Nicholas Atkin, The Forgotten French: Exiles in the British Isles, 1940-44. MUP: Manchester 2003.
Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, La France Libre: De l’appel du 18 juin à la Libération.Gallimard: Paris 1996.
Next week, the Centre for British Studies at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin will host the ADEF Workshop “Competitors & Companions: Britons and Germans in the World”, organized by Daniel Steinbach (Exeter), Tobias Becker (GHI London) and myself. The complete programme of the workshop is available at the ADEF homepage. Please register to attend the workshop. The public Keynote Lecture will be given by Professor Gaynor Johnson (Kent).
GRR Legal History Research group: Our next meeting will discuss “Contracts” on Friday, 12th May 2017, with short presentations by Thomas Pierson (Gießen), Robert Kindler (HU Berlin) and Arvid Schors (Freiburg/Br.).
Recently, the Wiener Library in London has opened the United Nations War Crimes Commissions Archives to the public. The opening has attracted publicity well beyond the academic community (as for example in this article published in the guardian where the now accessible documents have been considered to “rewrite chapters of history”. The documents prove the impact of “smaller” nations on the definitions of post-war justice, thus displaying how collaboration within the London Moment worked: governments-in-exile and exiled experts of international law were highly influential in laying the ground for the work of UNWCC.
I am a Freigeist Fellow at the Department of History, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin and the principal investigator of the research project “The London Moment”, funded by the Volkswagen Foundation. I have been awarded a PhD in Modern History by the Eberhard-Karls Universität Tübingen in 2008. Since then, I have held fellowships at Trinity College Dublin, University College Dublin and the Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin, and have lectured in Modern European History in TCD and UCD Dublin, Tübingen and HU Berlin.
I have published on paramilitary violence, pacifism, veterans’ welfare, and international collaboration. My first book on Polish veterans of the First World War, their struggle for social benefits and national recognition, was published in 2011. While working in an international research project on paramilitary violence after the First World War in Dublin, led by John Horne and Robert Gerwarth, I edited a CEH Special Issue entitled “Aftershocks. Violence in Dissolving Empires after the First World War” as well as a volume on Veterans’ Internationalism (both with John Paul Newman).
My current research project “The London Moment” explores the transnational collaboration of governments-in-exile in London during the Second World War and its impact on European political communication in the 20th Century.
Review of: Hoffmann, Stefan-Ludwig (Hrsg.): Moralpolitik. Geschichte der Menschenrechte im 20. Jahrhundert. Göttingen : Wallstein Verlag 2010; Prost, Antoine; Winter, Jay: René Cassin et les droits de l’homme. Le projet d’une génération. Paris : Libraire Arthème Fayard 2011; Spiering, Menno; Wintle, Michael (Hrsg.): European Identity and the Second World War. Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan 2011; Plesch, Dan: America, Hitler and the UN. How the Allies won World War II and forged a Peace. New York : I.B. Tauris 2010; Láníček, Jan; Jordan, James (Hrsg.): Governments-in-Exile and the Jews during the Second World War. Edgware : Vallentine Mitchell 2013; Frei, Norbert; Weinke, Annette (Hrsg.): Toward a New Moral World Order?. Menschenrechtspolitik und Völkerrecht seit 1945. Göttingen : Wallstein Verlag 2013.
Full review (in German) on HSozKult: http://www.hsozkult.de/searching/id/rezbuecher-20869?title=geschichte-der-menschenrechte&q=Eichenberg&sort=&fq=&total=77&recno=2&subType=reb
ADEF – Annual Conference, Berlin, 19 – 20 May 2017
Competitors and Companions: Britons and Germans in the World (19th and 20th Century)
This workshop is concerned with British-German relations beyond government level. While official bilateral relations between Germany and Britain have been thoroughly studied, their ‘unofficial’ connections and interactions await a systematic exploration. These encounters are manifold as Britons and Germans met in various different contexts at home, in Europe, and the wider world and constantly had to define their relationship to one another as either competitors or companions against a third ‘other’. In the colonial sphere a strong sense of a mutual ‘European-ness’ towards the indigenous population could override economic rivalry and cultural differences. Archaeological expeditions or other scientific endeavours could either create transnational collaboration or nationalist competition. Artists, musicians, missionaries, or explorers might be asked to further their countries’ reputation while they sometimes felt closer to their peers and colleagues of other national background. Diplomats representing their nations and pursuing their politics would still share the life and moral index of the diplomatic corps. On the other hand, British and German representatives at multinational organisations or the EU often opted for a surprisingly nationalistic approach and economic, political, and military collaboration was repeatedly undermined by espionage or even sabotage. The varying degrees of competition and/or collaboration were not necessarily in accordance with official policy and diplomatic relations and sometimes in direct contrast to them.
The workshop discusses different aspects of British-German relations between confrontation and cooperation during the 19th and 20th century in a global perspective, while at the same time explores the creation, role, and impact of ‘the other’ and ‘the third’ in the fluctuating construction of companionship and competition.
Convenors: Tobias Becker (GHI London), Julia Eichenberg (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin), Daniel Steinbach (University of Exeter)
Keynote Speaker: Prof Gaynor Johnson (University of Kent)
We invite proposals that investigate examples and case studies of British-German encounter in an international context discussing questions of competition and/or collaboration. All speakers are expected to deliver their papers in English.
The workshop will be held 19-20 May 2017 at the Centre for British Studies (Großbritannienzentrum) at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin.
In the interests of fostering stronger links between scholars in Germany and the United Kingdom and Ireland, the German Historical Institute London will cover travel expenses for accepted speakers travelling in from the British Isles. Accepted speakers from Germany may qualify for bursary to cover travel expenses, depending on funding.
Proposals (in English) should include a brief one-page C.V. and a 250-word abstract of the proposed paper, and are due by 1 March 2017. Submissions and all inquiries should be directed to email@example.com
For more general inquiries about ADEF:
When the Nazis conquered the continent in 1939/1940, political elites from all over Europe fled to Great Britain, last remaining safe haven of the Allies in reachable distance. Most European governments whose territory was now being occupied by Nazi Germany moved to London. Representatives of France, Poland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Norway and Greece inhabited flats and houses in the British capital, all around Hyde Park and close to the British authorities. A significant number of them had arrived as individual refugees, but once in London, they revived their former contacts to set up the mechanics of national committees and governments-in-exile, but also to continue political collaboration on an international level. The British government and King offered symbolical and political, but also substantial technical and financial support. European cooperation was expected to strengthen the allied cause. Needless to say, this collaboration also entailed conflicts. But, for the time of the war, the European political exiles and their British counterparts were stuck with each other – and most intended to make the best of this unusual geographical proximity and collaborate closely to defeat Nazism and plan a post-war world. Thus, just as Berlin became the capital of fascist Europe, London became the capital of free Europe, the seat of almost all European governments.
This blog engages with the history of collaboration between the European governments-in-exile in London during the Second World War and between them and their host country, Great Britain. It discusses questions of international relations using the local urban study of central London during the war. A special interest is given to aspects of legal history: The legal position of governments-in-exile, the activities of international lawyers in their circles, and the discussions leading to a new international law and international juridicial system.